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Abstract In almost all opt-in systems of postmortal organ
procurement, if the deceased has not made a decision about
donation, his relatives will be asked to make it. Can this
decision power be justiﬁed? I consider three possible jus-
tiﬁcations. (1) We could presume the deceased to have
delegated this power to his relatives. (2) It could be argued
that, if the deceased has not made a decision, a proxy
decision has to be made in his best interests. (3) The rel-
atives could have a standing of their own because they are
singled out from the parties whose interests are being
affected by the decision by the special relation they had to
the deceased. None of these arguments turns out to be
convincing.
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Introduction
Legal systems of the procurement of postmortal organs for
transplantation are usually classiﬁed into opt-in and opt-out
systems. Systems of both types aim to respect the decision
of the deceased person, whether his decision is to donate or
to refuse donation, or to hand over the decision to his
relatives (or to some other person). The basic difference
between these systems of organ procurement concerns
what they take to be the default: what will happen when the
deceased has not made any decision at all. In pure opt-in
systems the default is that no removal of organs will take
place, in opt-out systems that it will take place.
1 In almost
all systems commonly known as opt-in systems, however,
the actual default is that the decision will be made by the
family of the deceased, hence a threefold classiﬁcation
would be more accurate than the present one.
In this paper I want to discuss the role of the relatives in
so-called opt-in systems, where the actual default is that
they decide. My basic question is whether this choice of
default can be justiﬁed. As a matter of fact, however, the
relatives have a similar role in opt-out systems as we know
them. For in such systems the default—removal of the
organs- can be defeated in two ways: by the refusal of the
deceased person, registered before her death, or by the
actual refusal of the family. In some cases this power of
veto is recognized by the law, in other cases it isn’t, but in
actual practice it is recognised virtually always and
everywhere.
2 Hence that the next of kin have the last word
is the most common, almost universal, feature of the
existing systems of postmortal organ procurement.
That the relatives have the last word in all systems,
however, doesn’t mean that after all there really is no
difference between opt-out and opt-in systems as we know
them.
3 For even for the way in which they normally use
this power it may be relevant what the default is. This may
be relevant in itself, but also because of the information it
provides indirectly about the preferences of the deceased.
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1 Japanese law requires the consent of the donor for declaring him
dead at the moment of brain-death, and hence for the removal of his
organs. Lebanese law requires the consent of both the deceased and
his relatives.
2 It is legally recognized in most countries with an opt-out system,
but, for example, not in Austria and Italy. For France and Spain see
note 11.
3 As some authors suggest, e.g. Gevers et al. (2004).
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will concentrate my discussion on the purest case, which is
the role of the relatives in opt-in systems. Having decided
whether any justiﬁcation can be found for taking the
decision power of the family as our default, I will then go
on to consider the possible justiﬁcations of this power as a
defeating consideration.
I do not embark on this investigation with a revisionist
mind. For such a common feature one expects to be able to
ﬁnd a rationale and it would not be unwelcome ro ﬁnd it.
What I have to report, however, is failure in this respect on
the whole. The only, rather modest status of the family
which turns out to be justiﬁable is a power of veto in the
one kind of opt-out system which can claim to satisfy fully
the requirement of consent (Sect. ‘‘First conclusion: the
vain pretentions of opt-in systems’’).
Possible strategies of justiﬁcation
In considering the possibilities of justifying a decision-
making power of the relatives within the framework of opt-
in systems, we can start by noticing an obvious objection to
attributing any such power to them. The common presup-
positionoftheopt-insystemsisthat,ceterisparibus,nothing
can be done to the body of a person, not even her dead body,
without her consent. Indeed, this is often, albeit mistakenly,
supposed to be an implication of the basic human right to
bodily integrity. (Wilkinson 2007).
4 My right to dispose of
my own body follows from the special relation that exists
between me and my body, a relation which fundamentally
changes, but does not end with my death. Itchanges because
I am no longer co-existent with my body, but it does not end
because as a living person I have a special stake in what
happens to my body after my death, for example that it will
be treated with respect. It is basically a negative, not a
positive right: it prohibits other people to do things with my
bodywithoutmyconsent,butitdoesn’tgivemethepowerto
claim positive efforts from them.
If, however, my relatives are allowed to permit the
removal of my organs after my death when I have not made
any explicit decision about this matter at all before I died,
such decisions seem to violate the requirement of consent.
The same objection can of course be made to opt-out
systems as such. This objection can be and has been met in
three different ways, which, it will turn out, are possibly
available in an analogous way for defending the decision
powers of the family in opt-in systems.
The three ways of defending opt-out systems differ in
the importance they attribute to the requirement of consent.
According to the ﬁrst justiﬁcation the requirement of
consent can be overridden by other important counter-
vailing interests. This is recognized by all legal systems
which permit post-mortem autopsies of bodies, on the
orders of some legal authority, in the interests of criminal
justice, without prior consent. It could be argued that the
requirement can equally well be overridden by the urgent
interests of patients suffering from organ failure in
receiving organs for transplantation. In that case the
availability of the opt-out option can be seen as a kind of
compromise: even if the system doesn’t require consent, it
stops short of relying on coercion. In that respect it still
differs fundamentally from conscription systems.
5
According to the second and third justiﬁcation of opt–
out systems there is no need to override the requirement of
consent. According to the second justiﬁcation the require-
ment can be satisﬁed. For even if consent has not actually
been given, it can at least be ‘presumed’, if the opt-out
option has not been used. In the English-speaking world
opt-out systems of organ procurement are even usually
referred to as ‘presumed consent’ systems. This is unfor-
tunate, for it overlooks the possibility of the ﬁrst and third
justiﬁcation. The ﬁrst justiﬁcation as a matter of fact may
have been the most prominent justifying ground for the
introduction of such systems in most European countries.
Whether or not a presumed consent defence is available
for opt-out systems, turns out to depend on the proper
conception of ‘consent’. According to some theorists con-
sent is basically a mental state: to consent to some action
means to prefer it to all feasible alternatives. On this
conception it makes sense to provide evidence of what a
person would have preferred, if she is no longer there to tell
us. On the alternative conception of consent it is a public
act of authorisation which gives another person a right to
do something which he hadn’t before. To consent is to
publicly exercise a power of authority in determining other
peoples’ rights and duties. On this conception consent can
only actually be given, not presumed. If no proper act of
authorization has taken place, consent has not been given,
whatever we may infer, and infer correctly, about the
preferences of the agent. I have elsewhere defended a
public act conception of consent, and will presuppose in
this paper that it provides us with a decisive argument
against presuming consent (den Hartogh (forthcoming); cf.
Wertheimer 2003).
According to the third justiﬁcation it can be allowed that
to consent is to publicly exercise an authority. However,
4 As he says, the right to bodily integrity is one of our basic rights
because we are embodied beings, but my dead body is no longer the
embodiment of ‘me’. He also rightly points out that a right to bodily
integrity would not rule out the overruling by the family of a decision
to donate, because it is only a negative right.
5 Many opponents of ‘presumed consent’ see hardly any difference
with conscription, e.g. Veatch (2000), Etzioni (2003), Bell (2006),
and Godbout and Caille ´ (1992).
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to exercise her authority. An exemplary case occurs when a
person is transferred to a hospital in a comatose condition
after a stroke or an accident, and we have to decide whether
or not to reanimate her. We can no longer ask her what we
should do, hence we have no alternative but to attempt to
act in her best interests as we can best ascertain these to be.
In such a case we are not overriding the requirement of
consent; it simply doesn’t stand in our way (den Hartogh
submitted).
6
These three strategies of defending opt-out systems can
analogously be used for justifying the decision power of
the next of kin in opt-in systems. I will consider all three of
them, beginning with the second strategy (Sect. ‘‘Presumed
delegation’’), and then proceeding to the third (Sect.
‘‘Donation by procuration?’’) and the ﬁrst (Sects. ‘‘A gift
from the next of kin?’’ and ‘‘The weakest party’’).
Presumed delegation
Opt-in systems presuppose that your rights over your own
body make it unacceptable to take your organs without
your consent. But if that is correct, how should we judge
opt-in systems as we know them? As we saw in Sect.
‘‘Introduction’’, almost no country in the world has a pure
opt-in system
7: if you have not registered any decision,
your relatives will be asked to make the decision in your
place. How can we justify this power? In particular, how
can we reconcile it with your right to make decisions
concerning your own dead body? The only remotely
plausible way seems to be: by presuming that people who
make no decision themselves, consent to the decision to be
made by their relatives. From this perspective the existing
opt-in systems themselves turn out to be a kind of
presumed consent systems. What they ‘presume’ is consent
to delegation: a person does not himself lift the barrier
blocking access to his private domain, but he authorizes
someone else to lift it.
Such systems are open to the same objection to pre-
suming consent that I mentioned in Sect. ‘‘Possible strate-
gies of justiﬁcation’’.
8 Presumed consent is false money, for
what it presumes is only preference, and preference is not
consent. It is a remarkable fact about the organ donation
debate that so many authors (and parliamentarians) criticize
presumed consent systems, often vehemently, as being
incompatible with ‘the right to self-determination’, without
noticing that the system they support is vulnerable to the
very same basic objection.
9 It is based on a counterfeit.
Actually the legal situation is often even worse. The
argument of this section concerns opt-in systems which
give each person a number of options to choose from,
including the option of refusal, and only presume delega-
tion if she doesn’t make use of any of those options. But
many of the so-called opt-in systems we know do not even
satisfy this description. In the UK, in Ireland and in some
Swiss cantons it is relatively easy to register consent, in a
Donor Register or by ﬁlling in a donor card, but it is much
more difﬁcult to register refusal, which might require a
living will, signed in the presence of witnesses. In the
United States both donor cards and state registries usually
have the same limited range of options, although in most
states one can also tick yes or no on one’s driver’s license.
In some US states, moreover, hospital teams just have to
make a reasonable effort to discover a registered will or
locate next of kin: if the efforts are unsuccessful, they are
free to proceed as they wish (Morris 2002).
Such systems violate everyone’s right to decide about
their own bodies, including even the right of those who
register their willingness to donate. Your right is, justi-
ﬁedly or not, not fully respected if non-removing of organs
is not taken to be the default, but your right is even less
respected if it is made difﬁcult for you to register refusal at
all. In a system in which refusal would not be assumed as
the default and could not be registered at all, consent would
lose all meaning. In terms of your authority-right such a
system would really be on a par with a conscription system,
since it would depend on the will of other people whether
your organs would be taken or not.
6 I have argued there that there are decisive differences between this
case and taking organ removal as our default. I will draw upon that
argument in Sect. ‘‘Donation by procuration?’’, but do not presuppose
its validity.
7 See note 1. It is also worth noting that in opt-in countries it is either
legally allowed (UK) or common practice (the Netherlands) not to
request consent for the following procedures: to go on with artiﬁcial
respiration until brain death sets in, even if this does not serve any
interest of the dying patient himself, and to take steps for preserving
the organs, in particular in the case of potential non-heart beating
donors (see Bell 2006). Such steps are also taken without prior
consent in the programmes, recently introduced in the USA, for
retrieving organs from people who have suddenly died from cardiac
arrest outside the hospital (Dubois 2009). In the description Wall et al.
(2009) give of this procedure it is justiﬁed in terms of presumed
consent. Requesting consent in the few minutes before ischemic
damage occurs is often not feasible, and if it is feasible, many family
refusals would probably occur. But if these considerations justify
proceeding without actual consent, why is such consent required for
taking out the organs? Cf. Verheyde et al. (2009).
8 It may be possible for them, however, to meet the burden of proof,
for evidence may be available showing that most people who didn’t
register a decision themselves, will be happy to have the decision
made by their relatives. For the Netherlands see Taels and van Raaij
(2008).
9 Veatch (2000, p. 161) recognizes that decision by the next of kin is
problematic from the point of view of the right of self-determination,
but not that it is precisely as problematic as presumed consent and for
the very same reason.
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which, whatever the law says, the next of kin can effec-
tively decide to donate, even if the decision of the deceased
to refuse donation is recorded on a valid document. This is
reported to be the practice of no less than 43% of the
American organ procurement organizations (Wendler and
Dickert 2001).
Donation by procuration?
It is often suggested that the relatives have a proxy right to
decide in cases in which no decision of the deceased is
known—they are donors by procuration. In that case they
would be duty-bound to make the decision they think he
would have made. The suggestion is implied by another
argument which has often been made, for example by the
legislator of the Dutch Law on the Donation of Organs of
1998. According to this argument opinion surveys show
that many more people are actually prepared to donate than
have registered a positive decision. In order to create the
opportunity that the positive attitude of these people will be
acted upon, we give their relatives the right to consent to
the taking of the organs. It is obvious that this argument
presupposes that the relatives will decide in the spirit of the
deceased. They are supposed to be delegates.
10 The case,
as I pointed out in Sect. Possible strategies of justiﬁcation,
can be compared to the situation arising when a decision
has to be made about medical treatment of a patient who is
unable to consent himself. In that case many legal systems
give a right of proxy decision making to his relatives.
However, such situations differ from the present one in
two respects. If a person gets unconscious as a result of an
accident, there is usually no time at which he is able to
make a decision concerning his treatment himself. He may
only be able ex ante to provide general instructions, for
example about resuscitation, which necessarily leave a
large scope for interpretation. (May et al. 2000, 326–327)
Moreover, as a matter of fact no legal system requires to
ask people to make such an ex ante decision. But in most
opt-in systems (at least in North America and Europe) the
government actively invites all citizens to register a
decision, in a national Donor Register, on a donor card, on
a driving licence, or in other ways. If such countries had a
pure opt-in system, in which not taking the organs would
be the default, they might still have the same mechanisms
for consent, albeit not for refusal. In that case every adult
person would have all the opportunity he needs to express
his consent, or his delegation of the decision to others, and
there would not be any need for proxy-decision making at
all. Hence that supposed need cannot be a good reason for
choosing another default. Similarly, if a person has made
no will, on his death we dispose of his inheritance in
accordance with default rules provided by the law; we
would not consider asking his relatives whether he might
have preferred to deviate from those rules.
In the second place, we should ask why so many people
do fail to register a preference. Some people are not suf-
ﬁciently interested in the issue to spend time on making up
their minds; in particular, they don’t want to be confronted
with their own mortality. A much larger number of people
are unable to make up their minds. Yes, they are in favour
of transplantation medicine because of the extent to which
it improves patients’ chances of survival and their welfare.
But this rather abstract general attitude is counterbalanced
by a number of doubts concerning their own individual
cases: the burden for the relatives, some mistrust of doc-
tors, the wish to leave the dead body intact for some time,
and more or less vague religious objections. Interestingly,
these doubts tend to be expressed, not as beliefs to which
one clearly subscribes, but only as ‘feelings’. (Taels and
van Raaij 2008)
11 So it seems that the very failure to
register normally indicates either indifference or ambiva-
lence. The person either wasn’t interested in making a
decision, or unable to make it because of conﬂicting con-
siderations. If that is the case, by asking her relatives to
decide in her spirit we are asking for the impossible. Her
spirit has been characterized by indifference or ambiva-
lence, so it can be represented neither by consent nor by
refusal. It could be better represented by tossing a coin than
by asking the relatives.
So from the point of view of people’s right to decide
about their own bodies, the idea of proxy decision-making
is doubly problematic: there is no need to give anyone that
task, and it is normally an impossible task to execute.
12
10 That has often been reported to be the public’s general view of the
proper role of the relatives (Farsides 2000, with further references). In
the German transplantation law of 1997 it is explicitly stipulated that
this is the task of the relatives; they have to be asked whether the
deceased made any relevant statement during his life, and if not what
they presume his will to have been. In France and Spain the law
prescribes to ask the relatives for conﬁrmation of the consent of the
deceased, though in practice they are asked to consent themselves
(Nowenstein 2008). Actually, although for most relatives their view
of the preferences of the deceased is the most important consider-
ation, it is not always the only or decisive one—far from it (Farsides
2000. Siminoff et al. 2007; Sque and Payne 1996; Sque et al. 2008).
11 According to Sque et al. (2008) a similar ambivalence between
general pro-donation views and (in particular) concerns about the
wholeness of the dead body characterizes many relatives.
12 The next of kin also have the right to demand an autopsy.
However, there are considerable differences between this decision
and a decision on donation, which makes it difﬁcult to regard this as a
precedent. For instance, for lack of relevant information the deceased
is unable to take any binding decisions on an autopsy before his death,
not even in the form of a veto. In the case of autopsy, therefore, there
is every reason to assign the task of representing the deceased’s
interests to the next of kin after his death.
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in the spirit of the deceased, the signiﬁcant extent to which,
as we know, their decision actually is determined by other
considerations provides us with an additional reason not to
entrust them with this problematic task. If the family
refuses to permit the refusal of the organs because they
have not been treated with sufﬁcient concern and respect
by medical staff, they are, however, understandably, pun-
ishing the wrong people.
13
In many cases families apparently refuse to consent to
donation because they believe that they have no right to
dispose of the deceased’s organs if he hasn’t given his
consent personally (Eaton 1998; Nationaler Ethikrat 2007,
24).
14 For them the requirement of consent means that
refusal is the default. But that is the very position the
lawgiver wanted to avoid by empowering them to make a
proxy-decision. Obviously the lawgiver fears that a pure
opt-in system would substantially reduce the number of
organs available for transplantation even in comparison
with the present situation of pressing scarcity. But it is
doubtful whether that problem really is surmounted by
supplementing the system with proxy decision-making.
Instead of accepting refusal to be the default, the system
asks the relatives to reconsider, but in a context in which
they naturally continue considering refusal to be the
default. People who ﬁnd it difﬁcult to arrive at a decision
may be all too happy to leave it to their next-of-kin, but
they only inherit the problem and may ‘solve’ it in a similar
way. ‘‘They seem[ed] to regard ‘no’ as a non-decision’’
(Sanner 2007; cf. Siminoff et al. 2007).
A gift from the next of kin?
If the decision power of the family cannot be derived from
the authority or the interests of the deceased, this leaves us
with only one option for justifying that power: the relatives
could have a proper standing of their own. Their decision-
power on that view is not to be derived from the authority
people have over their own dead bodies, neither by pre-
suming consent nor by supplementing it by proxy-decision
making.
Which arguments could we provide in favour of this
independent authority? It is sometimes suggested that the
requirement of consent rests on an individualistic model of
decision-making which is not really accepted by people,
even in an individualistic society: most people who register
a decision do so on the basis of collective deliberation with
their relatives, and it is the same group, the family, who as
such is making the ﬁnal decision when the person has died.
(Boddington 1998, in a tentative way; Lauritzen et al.
2001) Hence we should not consider the individual rights
of the deceased but the group right of his family. But this
argument confuses the power to decide with a ‘‘model of
decision-making’’. There is not the slightest inconsistency
in a person having the power to make a certain decision and
her actually doing so in close consultation with others or
even delegating the decision to them. We need not deny
that agents are neither self-reliant nor self-transparent, and
hence in their decision-making necessarily depend on
others in all kinds of ways (explored in the literature on
relational autonomy, as summarized in Mackenzie and
Stoljar 2000) in order to go on insisting that certain deci-
sions are up to the agents themselves and not to those
others. A recognition of the social embeddedness of
‘autonomous’ agents does not commit one to hold only
families and other groups to be empowered to make deci-
sions regarding those agents. Occasionally the family is
reported to decide to which of its (usually junior) members
the task is assigned of donating a living kidney to another
family member in need of it, but we consider this objec-
tionable bceause it makes the individual into a mere means
for the promotion of the collective interests of the family.
So, even if we accept that people normally make such
decisions, to register as a donor or to refuse registering, in
consultation with their relatives, we are still in need of a
justiﬁcation of the independent authority of the family
when no such decision has been made.
To start with, we could point out that donation usually
demands a greater sacriﬁce from the next of kin than from
the donor. At a moment that they are still in shock about
the incident which took the life of their partner or child,
they see their loved one taken into the operating theatre
while he does not yet look as if he is dead, and have to wait
until he returns in the shape of a real dead body. Sometimes
they have to wait for this during the time that artiﬁcial
respiration is continued until brain death has been con-
ﬁrmed. And they subsequently have to live with the
memory of the whole course of events. (Klassen and
Klassen 1996; Mongoven 2003, 92) ‘‘The true gift comes
from the family’’ (Siminoff and Chillag 1999; cf. Lauritzen
et al. 2001).
A ﬁrst question about this view is whether it does suf-
ﬁcient justice to the point of view of the relatives them-
selves. Generally speaking, their main concern is what the
deceased would have wished. And even if they then con-
sciously decide otherwise, they do not usually do this
because they are giving priority to their own interests, but,
for example, because they want to protect the deceased’s
body and thereby his ‘person’ in a certain sense (Sque et al.
13 According to Radeck and Jaccard (1997) perceived support of the
medical staff is a pivotal factor in consent decisions, cf. Siminoff
et al. (2007).
14 If the relatives cannot agree among themselves, taking out will
also be refused, and the same happens when the burden of decision
making is too much for the relatives under the circumstances.
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responsibility for the decision, therefore, they mainly focus
on the deceased’s interests as they see them at that
moment. They do not claim their personal interests to be
protected by their authority.
This does not alter the fact that the deceased’s interests
are also their interests. It could seriously encumber their
bereavement and grief process if they felt afterwards that
they had failed their loved one at such a crucial moment.
However, if we allow them to have an interest which
requires to be protected by rights which overrides the
authority of the deceased, they are not the only ones who
may have such interests. We have also to consider the
interests of the patients suffering from organ failure and
waiting for a donor organ, and it can hardly be denied that
these interests are greater. Transplantation for them may
make the difference between life and death, or between a
relatively normal and a miserable life. Even when we take
into account the possibility of failure of the operation and
the adverse side-effects from the immunosuppressants
necessary for survival, the overall balance is clear.
But, it could be argued, it is not only a question of who
has the greater interests, for the next of kin have special ties
with the deceased that also entail special mutual care and
responsibility for one another’s needs. This special rela-
tionship gives those involved the right to concern them-
selves more with each other’s interests than with those of
anonymous strangers. It could be argued that this special
relationship still has this signiﬁcance when one of the
people involved in it has died, which is why it is proper to
give the next of kin priority over potential recipients of the
deceased’s organs. They are being asked to make a sacri-
ﬁce, and they are the ones to decide whether or not they
wish to make it.
15
This seems to be the basic argument for the independent
authority of the relatives. How should we assess it? Both of
the premises on which it is based are indisputable: the next
of kin have a genuine interest in the decision on donation,
and they (usually) have a special relationship with the
deceased. And I do not at all wish to deny that this special
relationship has a moral signiﬁcance. In his Enquiry con-
cerning Political Justice (1793), William Godwin, the
founding father of both utilitarianism and anarchism, dis-
cusses the dilemma facing me if I am only able to rescue
one person from a house on ﬁre: either Archbishop Fe ´nelon
(a philosopher who Godwin greatly admired), or his
chambermaid, who also happens to be my wife, mother or
benefactress. According to Godwin, it is a requirement of
‘pure, unadulterated justice’ to save the philosopher:
‘‘What magic is there in the pronoun ‘my’, to overturn the
decisions of everlasting truth? My wife or my mother may
be a fool or a prostitute, malicious, lying or dishonest. If
they be, of what consequence is it that they are mine?’’
However, anyone seriously able to subscribe in this way to
an impartial principle is not capable of forming close
intimate relationships. Therefore, we are not to be criticised
for giving particular care and attention to people with
whom we have a special relationship; on the contrary, if we
did not do this we would demonstrate that we have no
sense of the true signiﬁcance of this relationship. The
simple pronoun ‘my’ does indeed have magic.
16 That,
indeed, may be the moral basis of the whole practice of
living donation. (Hilhorst 2005).
But is this a sufﬁcient reason for allowing the next of kin
to decide? There are two reasons to have doubts. In the ﬁrst
place, even if we allow the special claims implied by
special relationships, it does not follow that they simply
eclipse all other claims. Let us grant that the donor may
multiply his own interests and those of the people with
whom he has a special relationship by a given factor before
he weighs up these interests against the recipient’s needs.
The moral magic of the pronoun ‘my’ is in that case
already included in the criteria for the existence of a duty to
help others in an emergency. This corresponds to the
common understanding of the duty as it has been classi-
cally expressed by Thomas Aquinas: ‘‘Those who fail to
give a gift are in danger of committing a mortal sin: from
the recipient’s point of view, if a clear and urgent need
becomes apparent and no helper appears and from the
giver’s point of view, if he can spare that which is not
necessary to him in view of his present situation…’’
(Summa Theologiae, 2ae, q. 32, a. 5, quoted from Schen-
derling 2003) Even on this loaded weighing of interests, the
needs of the patients seem paramount. After all, research
has shown that the donation process has no lasting psy-
chological consequences for the surviving relatives, not
even if they have doubts about the donation afterwards.
(Cleiren and van Zoelen 2002).
Moreover, our duties vis-a `-vis the patients may not be
exhaustively described by conceiving of them as duties of
rescue. For everyone of us can during his lifetime get organ
failure to an extent at which he can only be helped by a
transplantation, and therefore everyone of us beneﬁts from
the existence through time of a pool of organs available for
that end, by the assurance it provides of assistance in a
possible future emergency (Cleiren and Van Zoelen 2002).
Contributing to that pool therefore means participating in a
15 This important argument is rarely found in the literature. It is
brieﬂy outlined by Engberts (2005).
16 This should not be interpreted as criticism of utilitarianism in
general; utilitarians are able to acknowledge the importance of special
relationships and make allowances for them.
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123collaborative arrangement for mutual beneﬁt, and therefore
could be seen as an obligation of fairness.
17 And special
care relationships are not taken into account in forms of
cooperation for mutual beneﬁt in which contributions and
proﬁts are directly coordinated. Those who voluntarily
contribute less have fewer rights: the reasons why they
contribute less are not important. We cannot evade our
duty to participate in dyke surveillance during a gale on the
grounds that the gale also poses a threat to our bicycle
sheds or those of our children or neighbours.
So even if we agree that the relatives have relevant
interests and their interests should generally be given extra
weight because of their special relationship to the
deceased, it does not follow that these interests should be
given priority in this particular case. Even if we only have
duties of rescue to the patients with organ failure, their
interests seem to deserve priority. If, in addition, we have
duties of fairness to them, their interests need only be
weighier than those of the relatives to be paramount. And
they are.
It could be objected that this counterargument only
shows that the relatives should use their authority to decide
by giving priority to the interests of the recipients, not that
they don’t have the authority. This brings me to the second
reason why the present argument for the independent status
of the relatives fails. The appeal to their interests, and the
additional weight those interests acquire from their special
relationship to the deceased, does not establish that they
have any authority. Dead bodies are not usually considered
to be property that can be inherited. But even if proprietary
rights to dead bodies were to pass to family members
through inheritance, the duties we have discussed would
still be attached to these rights. It is true that, even if it is
allowed that these duties exist, it is an open question to
what extent they should be regarded as enforceable. If they
should not, we would have the right to refuse to register as
a donor despite the fact that this decision is liable to moral
criticism. However, the same cannot apply to our next of
kin. Even if we had the right to set aside our duty for the
sake of their interests, it does not follow that they also have
the right to set aside our duty for the sake of their own
interests. The interests of the family are a consideration to
be given its proper weight, but it does not follow that they
are protected by rights and powers of decision. (Wilkinson
2007, 34).
Suppose it did follow. In that case the relatives would be
entitled to this position of authority because a greater
sacriﬁce is required from them than from the deceased
himself. But if that were the case, the relatives should also
be entitled to veto the deceased’s own decision to register
as a donor. This kind of double veto is legally recognised in
countries such as Great Britain. However, it is widely
accepted, and in some countries, including the USA and the
Netherlands, legally established that registering a willing-
ness to donate not only means that consent has been given
for donation, but also that the relatives must respect this
consent.
18 In that event, the relatives cannot invoke the
special relationship they had with the deceased. But this
means that they cannot directly derive any right to decide
from this special relationship, since they would then be
able to exercise this right with respect to the deceased, too.
If the special relationship does have any signiﬁcance, this
is only because the deceased conferred this signiﬁcance on
it before his death. He must have done so explicitly. If the
next of kin are only entitled to the right to decide because
the deceased has conferred this right on them, default
cannot lie in delegation.
The weakest party
There is one more argument in favour of this placement
of the default that I would like to discuss, in particular
because it sheds an interesting light on the meaning of
default as such. Choosing the default is of immense
importance in contract law. Marie Jacob has interestingly
pointed out that the default in that domain is often
determined in such a way as to protect the interests of the
party with the weakest negotiating position. The reason is
that if the other party wants to depart from the default, he
will be obliged to open explicit negotiations in this
respect, which will invariably involve additional costs.
(Jacob 2006).
Jacob is of the opinion that in the case of organ dona-
tion, the patients in need of help have a stronger negoti-
ating position than the deceased.
19 But she entirely
17 More needs to be said to establish that duty, cf. den Hartogh
(2011), with further references.
18 In the Netherlands only 40% of the population concur with the
proposal not to ask for the consent of the next of kin if the deceased is
a registered donor. (Friele and Kerssens 2004, 18) The Dutch Organ
Donation Act nevertheless has an explicit provision of this kind since
2006. Most American states have similar laws, as well as Canada,
Australia and Switzerland, and of opt-out countries Belgium. But as a
matter of fact in none of these countries a persistent refusal by the
family to go along with the registered decision of the deceased to
donate will be overruled, and such refusals regularly occur, in the
Netherlands in 8% of the cases. In the USA only 12% of the OPO’s
will in such a case overrule the refusal of the family (Wendler and
Dickert 2001).
19 Her argument is that patients are supported by the institutional
power of the hospitals, but this is by no means automatically the case.
In many cases it is the task of the intensivists who were responsible
for the care of the deceased to ask the next of kin to consent to
donation, and they tend to identify with the relatives, not with the
organ recipients, see Sect. ‘‘Donation by procuration?’’
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tice, all over the world the next-of-kin have the last word,
and if only for this reason, the question of which party’s
negotiating position should be strengthened should pri-
marily be considered in relation to relatives and patients.
Of these two parties, patients waiting for an organ are
clearly in the weaker position. All they can do is wait and
see which way the decision will go, whereas the next of kin
can make their voices heard there and then. As long as their
relative is still alive, they are entitled to information on his
treatment. If this relative is not a registered donor, in many
jurisdictions their permission already has to be obtained in
the case of preparatory measures for the preservation of the
organs. Furthermore, the next of kin are in such a difﬁcult
situation anyway that we dislike the idea of confronting
them with the additional burden of asking them to consent
to donation. (As well as with all the relevant information
that may be highly confusing, such as the concept of ‘brain
death’.) Given the situation, it is almost in bad taste to
point out their moral duties to them, whether or not such
duties exist. In many cases, the doctors who ask for their
consent have just had to relinquish their efforts to save their
partner or child, and rightly feel jointly responsible for
ensuring that the family are able to come to terms with this
death as much as possible.
20 All these circumstances con-
tribute towards giving their interests at least the weight
they deserve to be given, and probably more.
It follows from this argument that we can even recom-
mend transferring the default to ‘donation’, without
invoking the moral desirability of donation, let alone any
moral duties. If we ask ourselves how the interests of all
parties concerned are actually weighed up in the decision-
making process, we see that patients waiting for an organ
run the greatest risk of insufﬁcient justice being done to
their interests. This also emerges from the actual results of
the process, with its alarming rates of family refusal.
Even if there were a reason for allowing the next of kin
to decide if the deceased himself has not registered any
decision, this does not mean that we should deliberately
keep this option open. The whole idea that we not only ask
the next of kin for a gift simply because we have no choice,
but even make a point of seeking the opportunity to be able
to do so, is highly problematic. It is preferable to refrain
from asking people for help in an emergency if these
people themselves are in dire straits: this is not fair to either
the givers or the recipients (Spital 1996).
21 For this reason
alone, we should prefer systems in which the decision is
made in advance, in terms of the consent of the deceased or
the needs of the recipients, or some combination of these
considerations.
First conclusion: the vain pretentions of opt-in systems
Opt-in systems claim to respect the requirement of consent,
which they hold to be implied by the authority of people in
regard to their own bodies, including their dead bodies.
This is the basic justiﬁcation of such systems, in all
countries which resist the introduction of opt-out systems,
in spite of the evidence that these yield better results, in
terms of the number of postmortal organs becoming
available for transplantation.
It is true that opt-out systems as we know them are not
fully compatible with the requirement of consent. But
exactly the same is true for almost all opt-in systems, and
for exactly the same reason. When no legally valid decision
of the deceased has been registered and the next of kin
decide nevertheless to donate, the requirement is violated
even if the decision is made in the spirit of the deceased.
For in such cases no actual consent has been given, and
there is no need for supplementing actual consent by proxy
consent. No-one who accepts such systems can consistently
object to opt-out systems. As we have seen, some opt-in
systems are even guilty of more grave violations of the
requirement than at least some opt-out systems, because
they make it more difﬁcult either to have one’s refusal of
donation registered, or one’s registration effective.
There is an additional point to be made which reinforces
this conclusion. The requirement of consent is supposedly
implied by the right to make decisions about one’s own
body, even after one’s death. But the number of options
you are actually given to choose from is extremely limited.
You can decide to be buried or to be cremated, you can
perhaps present your body to be used in medical education,
and you can be a donor. That’s about it. You cannot nor-
mally decide to have your body mummiﬁed and set up in
the hall of your alma mater, you are not allowed to be laid
down in a small boat to be delivered to the inﬁnite ocean,
and you cannot give permission for your mortal remains to
be fed to the tigers in the zoo. Most of these limitations are
20 Which is one good reason why he should not be the person who
opens the issue of donation with the family. Streat’s (2004) plea in
favour of the family’s right makes this perfectly clear by showing
how an intensivist experiences the situation: the person who
registered as a donor is dead, potential organ recipients are far away
and he is confronted with the family and their grief. Cf. Nowenstein
(2005, 180–182) about the attitudes of French doctors.
21 According to research by Sque et al. (2008) and Siminoff et al.
(2007 973), resp. 41 and 44% of the next of kin decide to refuse
consent to donation because the circumstances have already put such
a strain on them that they are unable seriously to consider the request
for consent. It is hard to reconcile this ﬁnding with the statement of
Sque et al. that being asked for donation does not create an additional
burden for the family.
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ciple: dead bodies left alone are a danger for everyone
coming into contact with them. Other limitations are be
justiﬁed on the offence principle: they forbid actions which
are supposed to show a lack of respect, not only for your
person but for humanity as such. This is also the main
reason given for the strict prohibition to give your body or
part of it to others on condition of any valuable reward.
22
But in addition to these limitations, in most countries the
only conditions you can stipulate for being a postmortal
donor concern the speciﬁc organs you permit to be
removed. You are not allowed to limit the class of possible
recipients, either to a person or to a class of persons, not
even to a harmless class like children. In this respect your
position is that of an individual seller facing a monopso-
nistic buyer. You are being offered a standard form, and
your options are only to sign or not to sign.
These limitations of your authority-right need to be
justiﬁed. It may be possible to provide such justiﬁcations
for each limitation, but then it may equally be possible to
justify taking out organs as the default, even if that would
involve another limitation. If one category of limitations
cannot simply be blocked by appealing to our ‘right of self-
determination’, neither can the other. People who reject
opt-out systems as infringing their right but accept that
organs cannot be sold and donation cannot be directed, owe
us an explanation why this particular inroad on that right is
so different from all the others.
23
If we insist on the requirement of consent for organ
donation, opt-in systems as we know them are equally
incompatible with that requirement as opt-out systems as
we know them. However, it may be possible to design an
opt-out system in such a way that it is fully compatible with
the requirement of consent, and in that case the same is true
about a system in which delegation to the family is the
default. In such systems every inhabitant of the country
who has not registered a decision is clearly and regularly
informed of what will happen when she dies leaving organs
suitable for transplantation: removal of the organs (in the
case of an opt-out system), or a decision by the family.
And, as second condition, it must be easy for everyone to
change her registration, by ﬁlling out a short form, and
sending it postfree or online to the registration ofﬁce.
24 If a
person does not use that option, we are allowed to take her
to give her consent to acting as the default prescribes: that
is not a presumed but a tacit consent, and tacit consent can
be genuine actual consent (den Hartogh (forthcoming 2)).
In the present climate of opinion in countries accus-
tomed to an opt-in system and its (false) claims, a suitably
modest proposal might be to introduce as the default in
such a system of tacit consent that the organs will be
removed unless the family persistently objects. It may be
true that this is acceptable anyhow to the majority of
people who do not explicitly consent. That fact, as I
argued, is not enough by itself to warrant concluding that
they (‘‘presumedly’’) consent to delegation, but under the
conditions stated it may justify a legal provision to that
effect. For within limits of reasonableness and fairness the
law can stipulate what counts as consent. That system has
two advantages in comparison to the usual opt-in systems:
it always provides the relatives with at least some infor-
mation about the preferences of the deceased, and it
legitimizes approaching the relatives in a non-neutral way,
asking them to give reasons for their objection, not for their
consent.
25
It may even be possible to offer a more principled jus-
tiﬁcation for this approach by appealing to the social em-
beddedness of autonomous decision-making. In the
literature on relational autonomy it is suggested that a
necessary (or at least a supporting) condition for such
decision-making is that the agent has some particular
attitudes towards himself, attitudes of self-esteem and self-
trust, and that a necessary (or at least a supporting) con-
dition for such attitudes to persist is social recognition of
the agent by others, in particular by his close relatives and
associates. (Mackenzie 2008; Anderson and Honneth 2005)
In order to maintain the social relations needed for auton-
omous decision-making people therefore would justiﬁedly
prefer to be supported in the major decisions they make as
regards their own life by their relatives, and this preference
tends to give these relatives some informal standing in the
decision-making process. If this is correct, it does not
justify ascribing a formal standing to the relatives irre-
spective of the agent’s actual consent, but it may justify
22 See the characteristically ﬁne discussion in Feinberg (1985,
72–75). For the prohibition other reasons are often provided, e.g.
the possibility of exploitation or resulting inequalities of access, but
such effects can be prevented by institutional arrangements. That the
sale of organs is seen as degrading seems to me the reason most
basically motivating the opposition to it, perhaps in addition to the
idea that the proﬁt motive would crowd out altruistic motives.
23 See den Hartogh (2002, pp. 67–71) for a criticism along these lines
of the consent theory of political obligation. If these limitations on our
options can be justiﬁed by other considerations without requiring
consent, why is consent necessary?
24 A system like this is at present being discussed both in Germany
and in the Netherlands. See Nationaler Ethikrat (2007); Coo ¨rdina-
tiegroep Orgaandonatie (2008).
25 It is open to discussion whether or not we should retain in that
system the option to register as a donor explicitly. This only makes
sense if the law does not allow the relatives to overrule that decision.
The effect might be that some of the people who now decide to
register will not do so anymore, and in those cases the number of
family refusals may be increased. But this may be more than
compensated by the decreased number of family refusals in the case
no registration had been made. See den Hartogh (2008, pp. 102–106).
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nition of a form of tacit consent.
Second conclusion: the role of the relatives
If, on the other hand, it is accepted that the requirement of
consent is not absolute, it does not follow that your next of
kin could be given the power to decide whether or not to
allow the removal of your organs for transplantation when
you have died. For it cannot be shown that the interests of
the relatives have a greater moral weight than the urgent
needs of patients waiting for an organ.
Undoubtedly the relatives have special interests in what
happens to the body of the deceased. The donation pro-
cedure interferes in complicated ways with the process of
taking leave, and they are the ones who have to live on with
the memory of that process. That is why the procedure
should be adapted optimally to their needs, and why they
should be properly informed about the procedure and be
given adequate support during it. But it is hard to see how
even the maximal protection of these needs could imply a
power to decide about donation, overruling the claims of
the patients on the waiting list. It may even be true that in
requesting them to decide we unnecessarily create an
additional burden for them.
So how do we explain the almost universal grant of at
least a power of veto to the relatives? It is often pointed out
that an overruling of substantial resistance of the next of
kin would risk creating a scandal in the media which could
do great harm to the general willingness to donate. But this
presupposes already the general feeling that such resistance
has a claim to be respected, and it is that feeling which is in
need of a justiﬁcation.
I have not been able to ﬁnd this justiﬁcation. My provi-
sionalconclusionthereforeisthatthefactthatnextofkinare
granted the last word in so many countries, sometimes
contrarytostatutoryregulations,isnotbased on anadequate
moral justiﬁcation, but on the sole fact of their presence on
the scene and the special consideration for their circum-
stances required at that moment. (May et al. 2000; Bucklin
2002) ‘‘T)heir state of mourning gives them the right to
oppose the harvesting of the newly dead.’’ (Nowenstein
2005, 181, summarizing the views of French intensivists)
Thedoctorswhomaketherequest,usuallytheintensivecare
physicians who have been responsible for the treatment of
thedeceasedaswell,rightlyfeelaroleconﬂictbetweentheir
traditional role ofprovidingas much comforttothe relatives
as possible and the duty to make the request. This role
conﬂict often causes them to shy away from upsetting the
relatives by ‘‘begging for body parts’’ (Sanner 2007).
Even if no justiﬁcation can be found, we should perhaps
regretfully permit transplant doctors to abandon the
removal of suitable organs if the relatives have strong
unsurmountable objections to it. But that will be done out of
consideration for their distress, in a situation in which they
already have to cope with the (often sudden) death of their
partner, child or sibling, and in full awareness of the wrong
we thereby do to patients suffering from organ failure. It
should not be done in recognition of a right to decide.
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